This paper addresses the difficulties of accurately defining a SWF, discusses the evolution of the original SWFs from stabilization to wealth funds, and examines how SWFs are organized and funded. We also detail the key measures developed to assess the operational and informational transparency and institutional quality of different fund by comparing the organizational structures, corporate governance systems, and investment patterns observed for SWFs with those documented empirically for other internationally active institutional investors. JEL Classification: G32, G15, G38
The economic role of governments has, of course, been evolving rapidly over the past several decades. States have always and everywhere regulated private businesses to a greater or lesser degree, but many also chose to enter business as owners. Mostly from the Great Depression onwards, governments around the world launched (or nationalized) companies that produced goods and services sold to the nation's populaces, often under monopolistic regimes [Shleifer (1998) , Megginson (2005) ]. As these state-owned enterprises (SOEs) spread and citizens experienced the often poor quality of their output, disillusion with SOEs prompted governments to adopt a new policy of privatization. Since its introduction by Britain's Thatcher government in the early 1980s to a then-skeptical public, privatization now appears to be accepted as a legitimate-often a core-tool of statecraft by many of the world's over 190 national governments. Since 1977, governments around the world have raised over $2.5 trillion by selling stateowned enterprises to private investors and corporations [Megginson (2013) ].
The historic rise of privatization as a core state policy has thus been well documented. As noted, what is far less well known is the frequency with which governments have been buying equity in listed and unlisted private firms. Contrary to public perceptions and despite the worldwide success of state privatizations, over the 2001-2012 period governments acquired more assets through stock purchases ($1.52 trillion) than they sold through share issue privatizations and direct sales ($1.48 trillion).
2 Much of this state investment was channeled through SWFs and, as we describe in detail below, the vast bulk of these stock purchases have been cross-border transactions.
In many ways, this surge is government stock investment is puzzling, since a huge volume of published research on government ownership documents dramatic performance improvements for privatized enterprises, suggesting that states should be reducing their ownership of corporate equity, rather than increasing it. A large segment of this research, summarized in Shirley and Walsh (2001) , Megginson and Netter (2001) , Djankov and Murrell (2002) , Sun and Tong (2003) , and Estrin, Hanousek, Kočenda, and Svejnar (2009) , suggests that governments are usually bad operating managers and that firm performance improves with privatization, while another stream of literature has looked at "mixed ownership" firms [Boardman and Vining (1989) ; Shirley and Walsh (2001) ; Lin and Su (2008) ; Borisova, Brockman, Salas, and Zagorchev (2012) ], generally finding that mixed ownership also has a negative impact on firm value. The world has thus been witnessing two powerful, simultaneous, and apparently contradictory economic phenomena over recent years: continuing sales of state-owned assets and enterprises to private investors by some governments, coupled with increasingly large purchases of private, often listed, corporate equity by other governments.
The key innovation that explains these apparent contradictions is that the recent government purchases of equity have been conducted mostly by state entities acting as investors rather than owners, buying non-controlling stakes in foreign and domestic companies in order to realize a long-term financial return, rather than to own and operate these businesses as state enterprises. This phenomenon can be called the rise of the fiduciary state, and sovereign wealth funds are the single most important expression of this force, as, over the past decade, their total assets have grown to exceed those of hedge funds and private equity combined. What makes this phenomenon especially important, and perplexing, is the aforementioned fact that most government equity purchases have been acquisitions in foreign companies, where the state purchaser cannot exercise any sovereign regulatory or supervisory power. These state shareholders have no more authority to monitor target firm managers than do private investors-and may well have less ability to do so, if they are politically constrained from being too pushy. As discussed more fully in the following section, all of the largest SWFs receive their funding either from transfers of oil (and natural gas) revenues earned by national energy companies or from transfers of excess foreign exchange reserves earned from exports and managed by the national central bank or Treasury. For this reason, SWFs are referred to as either "oil based" or "trade surplus based," and we will follow that nomenclature throughout this survey. However, we also stress another important method of classifying SWFs, which our reading of the empirical evidence suggests may in fact be even more relevant for explaining their investing behavior, operating philosophy, and how they are received by nations targeted for SWF investment-whether the funds are sponsored by democratic or non-democratic nations and, closely related, whether the funds operate in a transparent or non-transparent manner. 3 We further note that there is tremendous heterogeneity among funds, and thus any attempt to neatly "classify"
SWFs should be viewed with caution.
The overarching question/theme we address in this survey is whether SWFs are fundamentally different in organization, behavior, and/or investment objectives from other types of large, internationally active institutional investors that are operated by or for private owners [Chen, Harford, and Li (2007); Ferreira and Matos (2008) ; Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2009); Aggarwal, Erel, Ferreira, and Matos (2011) ]. The answer to this question should guide all optimal public policy and financial valuation responses to the rise of SWFs. On one hand, SWFs resemble other internationally active investment vehicles such as pension funds, buy-out funds, and mutual funds that have been extensively researched by financial economists. SWFs are particularly similar in structure and expressed objectives to hedge funds, as described by Klein and Zur (2009); Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas (2008); and Becht, Franks, Mayer, and Rossi (2009) Truman (2008 Truman ( , 2011 and others suggest, then these funds will inevitably be viewed and regulated differently than other large institutional investors.
This survey is structured as follows. Section 1 addresses the difficulties of accurately defining a SWF, discusses the evolution of the original SWFs from stabilization to wealth funds, and examines how SWFs are organized and funded. Section 2 describes how SWFs are organized and operated, and details the key measures developed to assess the operational and informational transparency and institutional quality of different funds. This section concludes by comparing the organizational structures, corporate governance systems, and investment patterns observed for SWFs with those documented empirically for other internationally active institutional investors, both state-owned and private. Section 3 concludes and points to issues that future researchers sorely need to address. Some definitions are broader than this, as in Truman (2008), who defines a sovereign wealth fund as "a separate pool of government-owned or government-controlled financial assets that includes some international assets." Consistently, Balding (2008) shows that an expansive definition encompassing government-run pension funds, development banks, and other investment vehicles would yield a truly impressive total value of "sovereign wealth."
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In this survey, we use the definition of a sovereign wealth fund employed by the Sovereign Investment Lab: (1) an investment fund rather than an operating company; (2) that is wholly owned by a sovereign government, but organized separately from the central bank or finance ministry to protect it from excessive political influence; (3) that makes international and domestic investments in a variety of risky assets; (4) that is charged with seeking a commercial return; and (5) Investment Authority (ADIA) has been awarded that title, but that was mostly because the fund has never reported its assets under management, and commentators assumed that Abu Dhabi's massive oil export revenues must translate into an equally massive fund, with AUM estimates often exceeding $800 billion.
The Only four funds are from western-style democracies (Norway, Australia, New Zealand, Ireland), though 6 For a comparison of SWFs with state-run pension funds, see Blundell-Wignall, Hu, and Yermo (2008) .They conclude that SWFs and public pension reserve funds (PPRFs) are similar in some ways, but differ significantly with respect to objectives, investment strategies, sources of financing, and transparency requirements. 7 The sub-national UAE funds included are the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (the world's second-largest SWF), the Investment Corporation of Dubai, Istithmar World, the Mubadala Development Company, the International Petroleum Investment Corporation (IPIC), and the Ras Al Khaimah Investment Authority. 8 The Kuwaiti SWF is also unusual among large funds in that it is funded based on a formulaic percentage of the sales of Kuwait National Oil Company. The fund is automatically granted 10% of the oil revenues of the state, and the finance ministry recently approved increasing the allocation to 25%. See Henny Sender, Kuwait Investment Authority: Integrity and caution are no handicap, Financial Times (April 24, 2013). 
The Historical Evolution of SWFs-From Stabilization to Financial Investor
Most of the well-established SWFs evolved in some way from commodity stabilization fund precursors. The main purpose of a stabilization fund is to offset revenue declines due to falling commodity prices or production levels, and most such funds are employed by countries whose budgets are highly dependent on natural resources, such as oil, copper, diamonds, or other commodities. A large portion of the existing literature regarding commodity stabilization funds has focused on their efficiency and on the related size question-that is, on whether current stabilization funds are under-or over- at promoting local development (by smoothing spending booms and busts related to volatile commodity prices), while SWFs aim at financial returns. As a consequence, stabilization funds tend to invest 9 It is perhaps no surprise that so many oil-funded SWFs are from non-democratic countries, since it is well established that abundant oil reserves (which promote large SWFs) and the evolution of democratic societies are natural enemies. Tsui (2009) finds that discovering 100 billion barrels of oil (approximately the initial endowment of Iraq) pushes a country's democracy level almost 20 percentage points below trend after three decades. Wolf and Pollitt (2008) and Wolf (2009) also show clearly that national oil companies are significantly less efficient and innovative than privately-owned international oil companies-and thus document the scale of value-destruction associated with state ownership/control of petroleum reserves and production. 10 Commodity stabilization funds are discussed and analyzed in Arrau and Claessens (1992) while the U.S. equivalent, state "rainy day" funds, are described in Douglas and Gaddie (2002 The issues raised by the early critics of SWFs included: (1) the possibility that their capital could be used to further political purposes and to acquire stakes in strategic industries; (2) the risk of equity price bubbles due to the sheer size of their investments and the related decline in demand for Treasury bonds; (3) the risk of an increase in volatility of financial markets; (4) the possibility that SWFs might have a detrimental effect on corporate governance because of political motives or lack of sophistication;
and (5) the risk of the emergence of a new form of financial protectionism as a reaction to SWFs. The criticism most often mentioned was (6) the lack of transparency by SWFs-and this is one criticism that lingers to the present day. There was also great concern (7) that SWFs were growing at what appeared to be an exponential rate. By far the most important fear regarding SWFs was, and to some extent remains, (8) that as state-owned funds they would not act as strictly commercially-minded investors, seeking only the highest possible financial return, but would instead be forced to invest strategically by home-country governments seeking political influence or access to foreign technology. Most of these fears have proven groundless, as there have been no major documented cases of SWFs investing abroad as political agents of home-country governments; quite the reverse-SWFs have proven to be passive and nonconfrontational with target firm managers almost to a fault. As foreign, state-owned investment funds, any posture that SWFs take other than being purely passive investors might generate political pressure or a regulatory backlash from recipient-country governments (Dinç and Erel, 2013 SWFs after large oil deposits were discovered off Brazil's coast by Petrobras; after two immense natural gas fields were proven within Israel's Mediterranean territory; in anticipation of windfall payments-that ultimately might exceed 10 times Papua New Guinea's annual GNP-from a newly-built liquefied natural gas export project; and after mining concessions were granted to foreign companies to develop Mongolia's huge new mineral deposits. Much the same experience motivated the governments of Ghana, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Tanzania to propose new SWFs after new natural resource bases were proven.
Greenland and Lebanon showed even greater anticipation, and proposed new SWFs after likely new natural gas fields in their territories were identified, but before their full commercial potential was even proven.
Angola, Chile, Iran, Nigeria, and Russia all launched new or restructured SWFs as a way to change how an existing stream of royalty payments would be administered. The stated rationales varied;
Angola and Nigeria set up new funds to increase transparency and ensure that the nation's resource wealth would not be misappropriated; Iran set up a fund to help it circumvent international sanctions; and Chile and Russia re-oriented existing funds more towards making international investments.
A third common motivation for launching a SWF has been to allow "excess" foreign exchange reserves held by the central bank to be channeled away from static holdings of low-yielding sovereign (usually U.S. government) bonds and into higher-return equity and corporate debt investments. This impulse to "sweat" excess reserves motivated the governments (or at least governing parties) of India, Japan, Panama, Saudi Arabia, and South Africa to propose new SWFs.
Three patterns stand out regarding all of the instances of new and proposed SWFs described above. First, these governments usually proposed setting up a wealth fund to preserve and protect new monetary inflows, rather than using the new monies to launch spending programs or to channel windfall funds through existing state-owned financial entities. Relatedly, all these proposals reflect a strong desire to ensure that new resource flows would be channeled through a transparent, accountable, and professionally managed investment company rather than through existing-and often quite corrupt-state investment vehicles or state-owned banks. 16 Third, almost without exception, these new funds are being modeled after Norway's GPFG with respect to organizational design, transparency and managerial professionalism, and investment preference for listed shares and bonds of international companies.
How are Sovereign Wealth Funds Organized and Operated?
All modern governments play leading roles in their nations' economic affairs, and they conduct direct financial interventions through a wide range of entities. At one extreme are official state ministries, such as the Treasury and the Finance Ministry, while at the other extreme are legally separate, individually incorporated state owned enterprises (SOEs) through which states exert influence as the controlling shareholder. In between these organizational poles lie regulatory agencies, boards and commissions (such as the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and the Social Security Administration); state-owned but separately capitalized commercial and development banks (such as Brazil's BNDES and Germany's KfW); and, most important of all, central banks, which are integrated organs of government, even when granted substantial operating autonomy. There is a wide variation in the degree to which these institutions are under the direct political control of the national government, how much operational discretion the entity's managers exercise, and even whether the entity's workers are state employees with civil service protection or are part of the private-sector workforce.
As described in Das, Lu, Mulder, and Sy (2009); Jain (2009); and Al-Hassan, Papaioannou, Skancke, and Sung (2013) , governments wishing to set up a SWF must confront all of these organizational, ownership, and personnel issues, beginning with the optimal degree of separation between the new SWF and the existing central bank and Finance Ministry. Stabilization funds and foreign exchange reserve management groups tend to be fairly tightly bound within existing entities, but when these funds evolve into SWFs most governments deliberately separate them-either legally or 16 The existing evidence examining the performance of state-owned investment vehicles is indeed quite damning. In particular, their investments in target firms' are generally found to be associated with lower target firm valuations [Jiang, Lee, Yue (2010) ; Lin, Ma, Malatesta, Xuan (2011)]. State-owned banks have also been documented to act and lend differently than do privately owned banks, and this generally is associated with poor aggregate economic performance and value reductions at specific target firms [LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer (2001) 
The Internal Governance and Staffing of SWFs -Why it Matters
A key fact about all the larger SWFs is that they tend to have very small staffs, even though many funds control assets worth more than $100 billion. Norway's GPFG, China's CIC, and Abu Dhabi's ADIA collectively have fewer than 3,000 employees, yet have combined AUM of over $1.1 trillion. In comparison, privately-owned Fidelity Investments manages a comparable amount of its clients' assets, but employs 38,000 people. These meager SWF staffing levels have two important implications for fund operations and investment management. First, most large funds employ numerous external managers to actually invest the funds' money and oversee segments of their portfolios, as described in Clark and
Monk (2009), Dixon and Monk (2013) , and Al-Kharusi, Dixon and Monk (2014) . 17 As in many other areas, Norway's GPFG and ADIA represent polar examples of this tendency. Since GPFG follows an almost purely index-matching investment strategy, it manages over 95 percent of its investment portfolio 17 Dixon and Monk (2013) and Al-Kharusi, Dixon and Monk (2014) also describe why many SWFs in distant (from major financial centers) regions might choose to set up satellite offices in financial centers or establish formal ties with asset managers located therein. Dixon and Monk note that many SWFs have grown disillusioned with paying high fees for mediocre returns; in their delicious phrase(page 42), "they [SWFs] were, and in most cases still are, paying for alpha but only receiving beta returns."
in-house (through Norges Bank Investment Management, or NBIM), whereas ADIA farms out over twothirds of its total portfolio to external management.
The second key implication of the fact that even large SWFs have small professional staffs is that these funds cannot play any important direct corporate governance role in the companies in which they invest. At any point in time, Norway's GPFG owns stock in over 8,000 companies, so it is unable to assign staff to sit on corporate boards or interact individually with investee firm managers-even if it wished to do so. Other funds, which do not spread their equity investments as broadly as GPFG, can sometimes assign staff to sit on the boards of a few large investee firms, but almost always in domestic rather than foreign companies. Bortolotti, Fotak, and Megginson (2010) find that SWFs acquire seats in only 53 of 355 cases (14.9%) where director identities of investment targets could be verified, and most of these were domestic companies. Even in those cases, the funds are much more likely to nominate an employee of a fund subsidiary company than from the parent fund itself.
Widely Varying Transparency Measures and Recent Changes
SWFs The two measures are quite similar in stressing how transparent the funds are with respect to their internal organization, the amount of information they disclose about fund investments, and their political distance from the host/sponsoring government. In constructing the index, Truman (2011) links together the following elements into four categories: "(1) structure of the fund, including its objectives, links to the government's fiscal policy, and whether the fund is independent from the countries' international reserves; (2) governance of the fund, including the roles of the government, the board of the fund and its managers, and whether the fund follows guidelines for corporate responsibility; (3) accountability and transparency of the fund in its investment strategy, investment activities, reporting, and audits; and (4) behavior of the fund in managing its portfolio and its risk management policies, including the use of respectively. These contradictory findings demonstrate that a particular fund's level of operational and disclosure transparency need not be a mechanical reflection of the openness or free-market orientation of the sponsoring nation. Instead, sponsoring countries can establish funds that are either more or less transparent than the society from which they emerged and for which they act as fiduciaries.
How Do SWFs Differ from Other Large, Internationally Active Institutional Investors
As discussed in the introduction, the key question regarding SWFs is whether they truly differ in form, motive, and effect from other large, internationally active institutional investors. In many ways, this question cuts across this survey and is reprised in each section. For example, an analysis of SWF portfolio allocations requires a private-sector comparison group, as in Chhaochharia and Laeven (2009) , who compare SWFs to pension funds, and Avendaño and Santiso (2012) , who compare SWFs to mutual funds; a discussion of the impact of SWFs on the behavior and governance of investment targets requires a private-sector benchmark, as in Liao (2011), or Bortolotti, Fotak, and .
Yet, we would like to briefly summarize here the main characteristics that make SWFs truly distinct and that carry important implications of potential interest to academic observers. In this respect, the defining characteristic of SWFs is their state ownership. On the positive side, in terms of social welfare, governments could have broader goals than simple wealth maximization at the firm level-for example, the maximization of employment levels and promotion of broad national industrial interests. On the negative side, politicians might distort priorities through their rent-seeking influence and because they impose on enterprises multiple, perhaps conflicting objectives. As state-owned actors, SWFs might suffer from such deviations from the set of objectives normally associated with private-sector investors, and this, in turn, might translate political influence onto their investment targets. In this sense, SWFs investments suffer from the same problems of "multiple principals" and cognitive dissonance described in the "mixed ownership" by Boardman and Vining (2012) and Vining, Boardman, and Moore (2014) . Yet, while many other examples of mixed ownership result in opaque entities, SWFs often apply mixed ownership to publicly traded, and hence transparent, firms allowing for a more data-rich investigation of the impact and efficiency of government investments. Whether this mixed ownership, as Vining, Boardman and Moore (2014) put it, results in the "best of both worlds"-merging government's concern for social welfare to private sector efficiency-or in the "worst of both worlds" (crony capitalism) is one of the lessons we can draw by investigating the impact of SWFs on their investment targets.
Second, SWFs, with rare exceptions, have no explicit liabilities-unlike, for example, heavily levered hedge funds or pension funds that have to budget for periodic cash outflows. In this sense, they have the potential to be true long-term shareholders, with very long investment horizons and very low liquidity requirements, possibly the most effective monitors as in Chen, Harford, and Li (2007) . Of course, whether that potential is realized or hampered by low staffing levels, political objectives, and a mistrust of a foreign government as a shareholder is a matter of empirical inquiry.
Conclusions
The research published so far has led to some important lessons. First of all, though large, SWFs should not be frightening. Their assets under management, at $4.5 trillion, while large in absolute terms, are still only a small fraction of the total value of financial assets worldwide, estimated at $212 trillion.
Further, while commentators often point out that SWFs are much larger than most hedge funds, they often fail to note that SWFs are dwarfed by banks, mutual funds, and insurance companies. Also, SWFs are often too politically constrained to be a serious financial threat, mostly due to the geopolitical goals of their governments that, far from pushing for influence abroad, often constrain their activities. Finally, SWFs are not only operationally and financially similar to other institutional investors, but often behave like big, passive pools of capitals (what cynics might call "big, dumb capital") due to low levels of internal staffing-or, as in the case of Norway, due to an explicit investment strategy aimed precisely at preventing undue influence and the resulting foreign backlash.
A second lesson emerging from this literature is that SWFs are not homogeneous-and should not be treated as such. Norway's GPFG stands apart, not just as the largest SWF, but also as the most transparent and diversified fund. GPFG has emerged as a true alternative to the "Yale Model" of endowment fund management, by limiting its investments to small stakes in a large number of firms diversified in both geography and industry. Qatar's fund, on the other hand, is the champion of a much more active role of SWFs, making fewer, large and visible investments both in equities and, even more, in iconic real-estate deals-and even playing the part of the deal-maker, as in the recent Glencore acquisition of Xstrata. Yet, to gain insight into SWF behavior, we should not be fooled by this heterogeneity, as SWFs are not idiosyncratic either; certain systemic differences can be identified and used to classify them into distinct groups. SWFs differ principally on funding source-with commoditybased funds on one side, clustering geographically around the Gulf area and trade-imbalance funds more common in East Asia-and on sponsor-country characteristics. While many funds originate from nondemocratic regimes, there are big exceptions as well. Finally, we find substantial differences in transparency levels.
Third, while it would be naïve not to recognize that SWFs are state-owned entities that often make politicized capital allocations, we need to be mindful of the fact that no evidence exists, to date, of political interference in the behavior of the foreign targets in which SWFs invest. Of course, the same cannot be said for their domestic investments-but it is the foreign actions of these state-owned vehicles that trigger most fearful responses. Accordingly, while we recognize the need to keep monitoring and studying the behavior of these state-owned investment vehicles in foreign markets, the evidence to date does not justify the protectionist response that so many commentators and politicians have been advocating.
In some sense, SWFs are a "second best" organizational form as fiduciaries. As state-owned entities, they are constrained in their ability to invest abroad and to improve the governance of their investment targets through active monitoring, as other institutional investors have been shown to do.
Small, under-motivated staffs, often associated with state-owned institutions, frequently compound the lack of activity induced by those constraints. As a result, while no definite statements can be made due to the distinctive lack of transparency of SWFs, what data is available indicates that private funds outperform SWFs across the board in their investments. Extant research has amply shown that state ownership leads to a dramatic deterioration in efficiency, as SOEs are often managed by teams that are either under-motivated and "captured," at best, or incompetent and corrupt at worst. SWFs, when properly organized, can insulate investment targets from political oversight and influence and, in this way, mitigate some of the problems that plague SOEs. In some sense, a properly structured SWF-and Norway is the model, with its management team well insulated (but, even then, not completely insulated) from political pressures-is a hybrid structure, allowing for government ownership without government management.
In societies in which the state plays a dominant economic role, SWFs might be the only real, feasible alternative to full governmental control. 
